Toxic Tourism 1AC (1/19)

\_\_\_. Tourism is the largest industry in the world. Nearly everyone tours at some point in their lives. Our debate community especially is a community of tourists. Each weekend we move around the country consuming resources and interacting in places. Most of us exhibit the worst characteristics in tourism, we are invasive and ignorant of the communities we tour. Our toxic tourism cannot be limited to our movement between places outside of the round, for we also approach the resolution as tourists, imposing values that would transform real spaces without considering the communities around the sites of energy production. Our tourism is toxic to these communities and to ourselves. We hate the damage we do to the communities we interact with. But tourism doesn’t have to be that way. Noncommercial tours offer an opportunity for a new type of community-driven energy politics.

Pezzullo, 2007. (Phaedra, Prof of Communication at Indiana). *Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of*

*Pollution, Travel and Environmental Justice*. The University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, AL. Pg. 2-4. ZDS

Beyond the undesirability of toxins and the perhaps unexpected pairing of them with tours, the use of tourism for politically progressive ends may seem odd for still another set of reasons. As Dean MacCannell writes, **“tourists dislike tourists. Further many of the people who are toured dislike tourists. Even scholars of tourism tend to dislike tourists. After all, what is there to like**? By definition **tourists are invasive and ignorant of their surroundings. Tourists make waste, take resources, destroy—or at minimum, transform—places, and encourage local communities literally to sell themselves and to commodity their culture for money**. So, for the most part, it’s not just that we don’t like tourists or find tourism pointless. Our disdain belies a strong more powerful, underlying cultural belief: ***tourism is toxic***. Tourism contaminates the people and the places where it occurs. Tourism corrodes. Tourism offends. Tourism exploits. In a sense, some might even conclude, tourism kills. Tours hosted under the rubric of “environmental tourism” or “ecotourism” only seem to exacerbate people’s cynicism about the practice of touring. Skeptics often sound either amused or disgusted by the proposition that touring might help to improve the world (“What self-righteous arrogance!” “How hypocritical!” “The irony!”). A consistent economic trend within the United States and abroad helps foster such suspicious responses; communities that turn to the tourist industry as their primary source of revenue often find that this choice is predicated on sustaining financially, environmentally, and culturally precarious positions. Consider, such as Michael Moore’s *Roger & Me*, documenting desperate tourist initiatives to boost the local economy in Flint, Michigan, and John Sayle’s *The Sunshine State*, dramatizing a scenario common in economically depressed areas of the Florida coast, in which residents and local business owners must decide what to do with their land and lives in response to offers from wealthy corporate land developers. As these two films attest, decisions about tourism as a means of helping the local economy or preserving local environments are rarely straightforward. But, **disliking tourists and believing tourism is toxic have a price**. At the very least, there is every indication that **tourism is here to stay**. It is an international phenomenon that we cannot avoid or ignore with much success. Tourism, in fact, is the largest industry in the world. **Globally, we spend more on touring than we do on eating**. Think about that for a moment. Consider all of these trips to a grocery store or to a restaurant or even to a field to harvest crops. Now, try to imagine more money, time, and resources. That’s how massive the tourist industry is. And our appetite for touring seems to keep growing.

(CONTINUED)

Toxic Tourism 1AC (2/19)

(CONTINUED)

This leads to the primary reason we should question our dislike of tourists: **most of us have been or will be tourists at some point in our lives**. We will travel to someplace at some moment in time in which we are visitors and are not planning to settle. It might be a trip to the coast or to the mountains or to a city, but we will be touring. **Disliking tourists**, therefore**, is really a way to express a dislike for ourselves, our culture, and who we have become**. Tourists dislike tourists because people dislike people. **We dislike the fact that we cannot always already belong wherever we go. We dislike the fact that we always appear to want to consume more. We dislike the fact that we love the same cultures and places that we seem to be killing every day.** In a sense, then, **claiming that tourism is toxic is about giving up on the hope that we as a people and as tourists can expect more form ourselves**. It is to resign to life as it is. Yet, of course, when stated so definitively, we know we can change. We being to distance ourselves from the tourist, the tourist who dislikes the tourist, the person who dislikes people, and we think that this conversation must be about someone else. Unless you are one of the few people who has never glared at a tourist, thought poorly of a tourist, or laughed at a tourist’s expense, however, this conversation is about each of us. The labeling of tourism as toxic, either explicitly or implicitly, implicates all of us who are invested in believing that our practices and beliefs can and should change.This book is written, in part with the hope of engaging the many overlapping conversations about the value of tourism and, in particular, the possibility that people, even tourists, can resist toxicity. **While it is important to acknowledge that tourism is capable of unpleasant, offensive, and harmful effects, I content that it is equally significant to recognize how and when practices of tourism may be motivated by our more admirable desires for fun, connection, difference, civic spirit, social and environmental change, and education**. In this book I draw from examples across the United States and its borders in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century to show how **noncommercial tours can serve as embodied rhetorics of resistance aimed at mobilizing public sentiment and dissent against material and symbolic toxic patterns**. By weaving together social critiques of tourism and the responses of communities to the burdens of literal chemical toxicity, this books aims to bring into focus and hold accountable deeply embedded and highly problematic assumptions about travel, pollution, and democracy.

Toxic Tourism 1AC (3/19)

\_\_\_. These tours expose human sacrifice zones, areas, typically populated by the poor and people of color, which are segregated away from centers of power and culturally appropriated as polluted spaces.

Pezzullo, 2007. (Phaedra, Prof of Communication at Indiana). *Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of*

*Pollution, Travel and Environmental Justice*. The University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, AL. Pg. 5. ZDS

“Toxic tours,” as they are called by those who host them, are noncommercial expeditions into areas that are polluted by toxins, spaces that Robert D. Bullard calls “human sacrifice zones.” More and more of the communities have begun to invite outsiders in, providing tours as a means of educating people about and, it is hoped, transforming their situation. For, although “all communities, at least in the United States in the [new millennium], . . . are contaminated to some extent,” some communities are “toxically assaulted.” These toxic assaults tend to occur in or on communities that historically have been segregated from elite centers of power, areas Robert R. Higgins argues are deemed culturally to be “appropriately polluted spaces,” such as neighborhoods of people of color and low-income communities. There exists, in turn, both a psychological and geographical distance between dominant public culture and the cultures of those who live in places where both waste and people are articulated together as unnecessary, undesirable, and contaminating. The creation of these “separate areas of existence” enables our culture more readily to dismiss the costs of toxic pollution because the waste and the people most affected by the waste appear hidden within their proper place.

Toxic Tourism 1AC (4/19)

\_\_\_. Touring toxic places disrupts the contaminated discourses that facilitate the exploitation of these sacrifice zones. These discourses of separating bodies are central to the discourses of normative whiteness.

Pezzullo, 2007. (Phaedra, Prof of Communication at Indiana). *Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of*

*Pollution, Travel and Environmental Justice*. The University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, AL. Pg. 69-70. ZDS

In addition to feminist writings about the body, scholarship regarding cultural, economic, and political patterns of racial oppression similarly has argued for the pivotal role of corporeality in addressing both domination and resistance. For instance, as Douglas has observed, **constructing “whiteness” as clean and pure invites practices that distance white bodies from the bodies of racial Others. As a result, several cultures have articulated**—or linked—**uncleanness and nonwhite bodies together as symbols of chaos, or dis-order, which must be resolved or erased from white spaces**. In these cultures, **exposure of “whites” to people of color is seen** in many cases **as working like a contagious and debilitating disease, one that attacks the “white” body, thus leading to stigmatization and systematic discrimination for those who risk association across racial boundaries.** This desire to identify people of color with pollution creates a pattern that Robert R. Higgins theorizes as a rationale for “appropriately polluted space.” **“When environmental pollution is relegated to such appropriate socially polluted spaces**,” Higgins observes, “**the environmental pollution is really ‘in its place,’ and therefore is not as noticeable as an anomaly or as an aberrant thing: it is relatively invisible in its physical and cultural separation from predominantly white, elite centers of power**.” In these instances, both waste and people of color are considered undesirable, unnecessary, and contaminating. As a result, the racial Other and the waste have historically been isolated in “separate areas of existence,” essentially from one’s (white) body and to keep one’s (white) body from resembling that of the racial Other have influence not only who some whites have wanted to be but also where some whites want to be: away from the polluting “disposable” and “unclean” racial Other. **This pattern of distancing and degrading people of color as pollution is also evident in persistent patterns of residential segregation in the United States and what popular contemporary media call “white flight,” in which white bodies flee from exposure to the bodies of racial Others.**

Toxic Tourism 1AC (5/19)

\_\_\_. One product of these discourses is that the American map is divided between elite spaces and those spaces occupied by what dominant society views as literally ‘garbage humans,’ individuals worthy of so little regard that they are literally trash to be thrown out of ‘our’ space. The result is a map of two Americas, one worthy of environmental preservation and another abandoned to annihilation.

Mills, 2001.(Charles W., Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois). *Faces of*

*Environmental Racism: Confronting Issues of Global Justice* (2nd ed.). pg. 84-89. ZDS

Only with a more realistic sense of this moral and political history, then, and with a correspondingly modified conceptual apparatus, can one hope to understand the problem of waste disposal and why it could be “political.” The functioning of the state, **the structure of space, the historic stigmatization of blacks within the white political community, the resulting partitioned ethic**, all **need to be taken into account in understanding the distribution of pollution** costs. **What should we do with trash? It depends on who the “we” are. If the polity is racial**, and political power significantly racialized, **then there will be a white “we” whose collective rationality** and moral group psychology **differ from the black minority and who have differential power over them. For this white population, the full members of the polity, blacks themselves have historically been so looked down on that “black trash” has been close to pleonastic**. “White trash” is an admonition, a cautionary epithet for those white people who do not, so to speak, live up to the responsibilities of whiteness, and thus lose their full status. Black trash, by contrast, is redundant, because “black” already has the connotations of trashiness. So from this perspective, **blacks are not part of the “we” who are facing the environmental problem of what to do with our refuse. Rather, there is a sense in which blacks themselves are an environmental problem, which “we” full humans (that is, the white population) have to deal with**.

In his definitive history of Jim Crow, Leon Litwack describes the growing alarm in the posthellum South about the “dark menace” of freed and increasingly assertive blacks: The very language employed to describe the growing Negro menace suggested that the problem be treated like any other epidemic or virus threatening the health and security of the community. To assess the results of emancipation was to raise the specter of blacks “inoculated with the virus of equality.” To talk about black political participation was to talk about “the cancer on the body-politic which, if not cured, will make of it a carcass.” To consider the social danger posed by blacks was to contemplate the need to avoid and reduce contamination, to dilute the black poison in the body of the South (as Atlanta’s chief health officer expressed it) to the point where it lost its toxicity. . . . If black people had become a source of social danger and contamination, the need to control, contain, and quarantine them in every conceivable fashion could no longer be questioned.28

(CONTINUED)

Toxic Tourism 1AC (6/19)

(CONTINUED)

Various solutions were considered for dealing with this threat to the white body politic. In the immediate post-Emancipation period, hopes had been entertained that blacks would solve the problem themselves by simply dying off: “The notion that black Southerners, no longer confined to the paternalistic custody of slavery and doomed to compete with whites, were destined for racial extinction enjoyed immense popularity in the late nineteenth century.”29 But unfortunately, the 1880 census showed their numbers to be increasing, so these Darwinian hopes had to be abandoned. An exterminist program to assist uncooperative nature had support in some quarters but was deemed somewhat on the extremist side. Colonization, simply purging blacks from the body politic, was a more respectable approach and had been considered at different times by Thomas Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln. But there were practical difficulties of organization, cost, suitable destination, and possible black unwillingness to go. In the end, Litwack points out, “most white Southerners settled on containment—not education or even gradual uplift but submission and permanent subordination, what one white frankly described as ‘back into slavery, without the name.’ “30 Sharecropping, convict labor, debt peonage, and above all the formal introduction of Jim Crow, legal segregation, can be seen as different ways of carrying out this program.

Segregation by law is the clearest manifestation of the physical control of the space of an inferior group, a group excluded from full membership in the polity, a group that must be morally, politically, and physically contained. And such “containment” would become the policy in the North also. In their account of what they call “American apartheid,” Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton argue that before 1900, “blacks and whites were relatively integrated in both northern and southern cities.” But all this would change with Jim Crow and mass black migration from the South. Through “a series of self-conscious actions and purposeful institutional arrangements that continue today,.. . actions and practices that had the passive acceptance, if not the active support, of most whites in the United States,” blacks were deliberately denied entry to white neighborhoods. By contrast, new European immigrants formed at worst “ethnic enclaves” rather than ghettoes. These enclaves were never homogeneous, were not particularly isolated, and unlike “permanent” black ghettoes, were “a fleeting, transitory stage in the process of immigrant assimilation.” Thus they were all eventually “spatially assimilated.” For blacks, on the other hand, the racial contract would inscribe—through neighborhood associations, real-estate dealers, redlining, restrictive covenants, and mob violence when necessary—a geography of aversion that would ultimately make blacks “the most spatially isolated population in U.S. history.”31 **Race**, then, **is the basic organizing spatial principle of the extended body of the polity**. Fanon points out that “Consciousness of the body . . . is a third-person consciousness.”32 Similarly, Gail Weiss has devised the concept of “intercorporeality” to signify the multiple, reflexive interrelations between our bodies, our perceptions of our bodies, and the reciprocal shaping of those perceptions by seeing ourselves through the perceptions of others: “To describe embodiment as intercorporeality is to emphasize that the experience of being embodied is never a private affair, but is always already mediated by our continual interactions with other human and nonhuman bodies.” Our “body images” are thus “constructed through a series of corporeal exchanges that take place both within and outside of specific bodies.”33 Applying this concept to political theory, one could say that the white members of the body politic continually exchange their whiteness with each other, recognizing each others’ bodies in the light of their full membership in the polity, and so reciprocally creating that polity. As white, as a full citizen, one’s body mirrors the larger body. One walks with confidence in the knowledge that one’s citizenship will be recognized, since it is written on one’s body—it is one’s body. And the image of the white body politic is then extended through relations of equal intercorporeal recognition throughout a whitened space. There is a macro-body, the collective white body, sustained by intersubjective, artificial, “contractual” agreement between the full humans, whose space is the locus of the body politic proper. And it is recognized as appropriate, through relations of unequal corporeal exchange, that the black body—in a sense the “nonhuman body”—be excluded from the macro-body. **Mainstream environmentalism is thus the environmentalism appropriate to** this body—the normative body, **the white body. Since white space has been historically privileged, white environmentalists can place their emphases on preservation and conservation**, slogans appropriate for those whose spaces have benefited from full incorporation into

(CONTINUED)

Toxic Tourism 1AC (7/19)

(CONTINUED)

the white macrobody. If the role of the sovereign, as “soul” (Hobbes) of the body politic, is to maintain the body’s health, then the role of the white sovereign is to ensure the health of the white body. **For a state founded on the racial contract, this will mean the differential allocation of resources to the creation and protection of white spaces**. And historically, **the state has** in fact **made both space and race, through demarcating by law the populations coded as races**, through enforcing segregation, and **through divergent treatment of the respective divided spaces**. Desmond King, an English political scientist, points out the disingenuousness of a mainstream U.S. political theory that “little acknowledges” the obvious fact that the federal government “constituted a powerful institution upholding arrangements privileging Whites and discriminating against Blacks.”34 **The racial state acts on behalf of the white citizenry, pouring resources into the privileged white spaces**—schools, infrastructure, job creation, highways, mortgage assistance, police protection—since they are our spaces, the spaces that we, the full citizens of the polity, inhabit. So there is no common space, as in the mythical raceless social contract. Rather, **there are our spaces and their spaces.** But even their spaces are in a sense ours—they are the spaces we concede to them, insofar as (short of outright expulsion) they have to occupy some space. Originally, it is explicit, then, that **blacks do not have free range over the topography of the body politic. Rather, they are restricted to second-class spaces, as befitting their second-class, subperson status**: Niggertown, **Darktown, Bronzeville, the black belt, the ghetto, the inner city**, in housing arrangements; and, when they are allowed to enter the public white space, the back of the bus, the seats in the balcony, the crowded car at the end of the train. **These spaces become identified as black spaces, and are derogated as such, signaling their nomncorporation in the respectable flesh of the white body politic**. King describes how: Prior to the end of segregation, the United States was subnationally a divided polity. Two political systems, mirroring two societies, the one democratic and the other oligarchic, existed side by side. . . . Segregation was an arrangement whereby Black Americans, as a minority, were systematically treated in a separate, but constitutionally sanctioned way. As the NAACP observed, they were treated “almost as lepers.” And this leprous flesh, the boundary of political, moral, and spatial exclusion from the body politic proper, marks the limits of the sovereign’s full responsibilities. As derogated space, inhabited by beings of lesser worth, it is a necessary functionalist space analogous to the body parts below the belt, the ones we keep hidden. Since the normative body is the white body, the black body, or the unavoidable black parts of the white body—its waste products, its excreta—need to be kept out of white sight. White space needs to be maintained in its character as white and preserved from contamination by the ever- threatening dark space—evil, shitty, savage, subproletananized. On the collective white macro-body, these spaces are literally blots on the landscape that we have to tolerate but that must not be allowed to trespass beyond their borders. **The politics of racial space** then **requires that the line be drawn, the boundaries not crossed. These spaces must stay in their place**. The racial contract is in part an agreement to maintain certain spatial relations, a certain spatial regime, the incarnation of the white body politic, the physical manifestation of the white Leviathan.

In this revised conceptual framework, then, it becomes unsurprising that the United Church of Christ’s Commission for Racial Justice found in the first national study on the topic (1987): **Race is “the single most important factor** (i.e., more important than income, home ownership rate, and property values) **in the location of abandoned toxic waste sites**.”36

(CONTINUED)

Toxic Tourism 1AC (8/19)

(CONTINUED)

**Some black residents** of these areas **feel “We don’t have the complexion for protection**.” A national investigation (1992) by the National Law Journal of Enviromnental Protection Agency cleanup efforts concluded “that the average fine imposed on polluters in white areas was 506 percent higher than the average fine imposed in minority communities” and that “cleanup took longer in minority communities, even though the efforts were often less intensive than those performed in white neighborhoods.” **Mainstream white environmentalists are perceived as caring more about parks and owls than people of color**. “Institutional resistance to providing information [on environmental issues] is likely to be greater for groups such as racial minorities.” In general, “Public officials and private industry have, in many cases, responded to the NIMBY [Not in My Black Yard] phenomenon using the ‘PIBBY’ principle, ‘Place in Blacks’ Back Yards.’ “41

In effect, then, these spaces can be written off because these people can be written off. The devalued space interacts with **its devalued inhabitants. They are “outside” the boundaries of empathy, not like us, not an equally** **valued body** in the intercorporeal community that is the collective white body. As Bill Lawson points out in chapter 3, “Living for the City: Urban United States and Environmental Justice” : “[R]acial and spatial difference marks important differences that must be given weight in our moral deliberation.. . . **Environmentalists have a natural conception of pollution as a negative norm. If a place is thought to be already polluted by racial identifiers, we need to contain the pollution by keeping it in that area.” Since these are already waste spaces, it is only appropriate that the waste products of industrialization should be directed toward them**. Like seeks like—**throwaways on a throwaway population, dumping on the white body’s dumpsite**. So the “environment” is not the same for these distinct and spatially segregated communities. **Black relations to nature have always been mediated by white power**, the sinews and tendons running through the white body. **The combination of environmental with social justice concerns**—so strange and radical from the point of view of traditional white environmentalism—then **is simply a recognition of this fact. Conservation cannot have the same resonance for the racially disadvantaged, since they are at the ass end of the body politic and want their space upgraded. For blacks, the “environment” is** the (in part) white-created environment, **where the waste products of white space are dumped and the costs of white industry externalized. Insofar as the mainstream environmentalist framing of issues rests on the raceless body of the colorless social contract, it will continue to mystify and obfuscate these racial realities. “Environmentalism” for blacks has to mean not merely challenging the patterns of waste disposal, but also, in effect, their own status as the racialized refuse, the black trash, of the white body politic**.

Toxic Tourism 1AC (9/19)

\_\_\_. The globalization of this organization starts processes of extermination worldwide. Communities of garbage humans globally are marked for annihilation.

Balibar 4 (Etienne Emeritus Professor of Philosohy at University of Paris-X and Distinguished Professor of Humanities at University of California-Irvine, We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, p. 126-29)

I am aware of all these difficulties, but I would maintain that a reality lies behind the notion of something “unprecedented.” Perhaps it is simply the fact that a number of heterogeneous methods or processes of extermination (by which I mean eliminating masses of individuals inas­much as they belong to objective or subjective groups) have themselves become “globalized,” that is, operate in a similar manner everywhere in the world at the same time, and so progressively form a “chain,” giving full reality to what E. P. Thompson anticipated twenty years ago with the name “exterminism.”’3 In this series of connected processes, we must include, precisely because they are heterogeneous—they do not have one and the same “cause,” but they produce cumulative effects: 1. Wars (both “civil” and “foreign,” a distinction that is not easy to draw in many cases, such as Yugoslavia or Chechnya). 2. Communal rioting, with ethnic and/or religious ideologies of “cleansing.” 3. Famines and other kinds of “absolute” poverty produced by the ruin of traditional or nontraditional economies. 4. Seemingly “natural” catastrophes, which in fact are killing on a mass scale because they are overdetermined by social, economic, and political structures, such as pandemics (for example, the dif­ference in the distribution of AIDS and the possibilities of treat­ment between Europe and North America on one side, Africa and some parts of Asia on the other), drought, floods, or earth­quakes in the absence of developed civil protection. In the end it would be my suggestion that the “globalization” of various kinds of extreme violence has produced a growing division of the “globalized” world into life zones and death zones. Between these zones (which indeed are intricate and frequently reproduced within the bound­aries of a single country or city) there exists a decisive and fragile super­border, which raises fears and concerns about the unity and division of mankind—something like a global and local “enmity line,” like the “amity line” that existed in the beginning of the modern European seizure of the world.’4 It is this superborder, this enmity line, that becomes at the same time an object of permanent show and a hot place for intervention but also for nonintervention. We might discuss whether the most worry­ing aspect of present international politics is “humanitarian intervention” or “generalized nonintervention,” or one coming after the other. Should We Consider Extreme Violence to Be “Rational” or “Functional” from the Point of View of Market Capitalism (the “Liberal Economy”)? This is a very difficult question—in fact, I think it is the most difficult question—but it cannot be avoided; hence it is also the most intellec­tually challenging. Again, we should warn against a paralogism that is only too obvious but nonetheless frequent: that of mistaking conse­quences for goals or purposes. (But is it really possible to discuss social systems in terms of purposes? On the other hand, can we avoid reflecting on the immanent ends, or “logic,” of a structure such as capitalism?) It seems to me, very schematically, that the difficulty arises from the two opposite “global effects” that derive from the emergence of a chain of mass violence—as compared, for example, with what Marx called primi­tive accumulation when he described the creation of the preconditions for capitalist accumulation in terms of the violent suppression of the poor. One kind of effect is simply to generalize material and moral insecurity for millions of potential workers, that is, to induce a massive proletarianization or reproletarianization (a new phase of proletarianiza­tion that crucially involves a return of many to the proletarian condition from which they had more or less escaped, given that insecurity is pre­cisely the heart of the “proletarian condition”). This process is contem­porary with an increased mobility of capital and also humans, and so it takes place across borders. But, seen historically, it can also be distributed among several political varieties:

(CONTINUED)

Toxic Tourism 1AC (10/19)

(CONTINUED)

1. In the “North,” it involves a partial or deep dismantling of the social policies and the institutions of social citizenship created by the welfare state, what I call the “national social state,” and therefore also a violent transition from welfare to workfare, from the social state to the penal state (the United States showing the way in this respect, as was convincingly argued in a recent essay by Loic Wacquant).’5 2. In the “South,” it involves destroying and inverting the “develop­mental” programs and policies, which admittedly did not suffice to produce the desired “takeoff’ but indicated a way to resist impoverishment. 3. In the “semiperiphery,” to borrow Immanuel Wallerstein’s cate­gory, it was connected with the collapse of the dictatorial struc­ture called “real existing socialism,” which was based on scarcity and corruption, but again kept the polarization of riches and poverty within certain limits. Let me suggest that a common formal feature of all these pro­cesses resulting in the reproletarianization of the labor force is the fact that they suppress or minimize the forms and possibilities of representa­tion of the subaltern within the state apparatus itself, or, if you prefer, the possibilities of more or less effective counterpower. With this remark I want to emphasize the political aspect of processes that, in the first in­stance, seem to be mainly “economic.” This political aspect, I think, is even more decisive when we turn to the other scene, the other kind of result produced by massive violence, although the mechanism here is extremely mysterious. Mysterious but real, unquestionably. I am thinking of a much more destructive tendency, destructive not of welfare or traditional ways of life, but of the social bond itself and, in the end, of “bare life.”’6 Let us think of Michel Foucault, who used to oppose two kinds of politics: “Let live” and “let die.”’7 In the face of the cumulative effects of different forms of extreme violence or cruelty that are displayed in what I called the “death zones” of humanity, we are led to admit that the current mode of production and reproduction has become a mode of production for elimination, a reproduction of populations that are not likely to be productively used or exploited but are always already superfluous, and therefore can be only eliminated either through “political” or “natural” means—what some Latin American sociologists provocatively call poblacion chatarra, “gar­bage humans,” to be “thrown” away, out of the global city.’6 If this is the case, the question arises once again: what is the rationality of that? Or do we face an absolute triumph of irrationality? My suggestion would be: it is economically irrational (because it amounts to a limitation of the scale of accumulation), but it is politically rational—or, better said, it can be interpreted in political terms. The fact is that history does not move simply in a circle, the circular pattern of successive phases of accumulation. Economic and political class struggles have already taken place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the result of limiting the possibilities of exploitation, creating a balance of forces, and this event remains, so to speak, in the “memory” of the sys­tem. The system (and probably also some of its theoreticians and politi­cians) “knows” that there is no exploitation without class struggles, no class struggles without organization and representation of the exploited, no representation and organization without a tendency toward political and social citizenship. This is precisely what current capitalism cannot afford: there is no possibility of a “global social state” corresponding to the “national social states” in some parts of the world during the last century. I mean, there is no political possibility. Therefore there is politi­cal resistance, very violent indeed, to every move in that direction. Tech­nological revolutions provide a positive but insufficient condition for the deproletarianization of the actual or potential labor force. This time, di­rect political repression may also be insufficient.

(CONTINUED)

Toxic Tourism 1AC (11/19)

(CONTINUED)

Elimination or exter­mination has to take place, “passive,” if possible, “active” if necessary; mutual elimination is “best,” but it has to be encouraged from outside. This is what allows me to suggest (and it already takes me to my third question) that if the “economy of global violence” is not functional (because its immanent goals are indeed contradictory), it remains in a sense teleological: the “same” populations are massively targeted (or the reverse: those populations that are targeted become progressively assimi­lated, they look “the same”). They are qualitatively “deterritorialized,” as Gilles Deleuze would say, in an intensive rather than extensive sense: they “live” on the edge of the city, under permanent threat of elimination; but also, conversely, they live and are perceived as “nomads,” even when they are fixed in their homelands, that is, their mere existence, their quantity, their movements, their virtual claims of rights and citizenship are per­ceived as a threat for “civilization.” In the End, Does “Extreme Violence” Form a “Global System”? Violence can be highly “unpolitical”—this is what I wanted to suggest— but still form a system or be considered “systematic” if its various forms reinforce each other, if they contribute to creating the conditions for their succession and encroachment, if in the end they build a chain of “human(itarian) catastrophes” where actions to prevent the spread of cruelty and extermination, or simply limit their effects, are systematically obstructed. This teleology without an end is exactly what I suggested calling, in the most objective manner, “preventive counterrevolution” or, better perhaps, “preventive counterinsurrection.” It is only seemingly “Hobbesian,” since the weapon used against a “war of all against all” is another kind of war (Le Monde recently spoke about Colombia in terms of “a war against society” waged by the state and the Mafiosi together).’9 It is politics as antipolitics, but it appears as a system because of the many connections between the heterogeneous forms of violence (arms trade indispensable to state budgets with corruption; corruption with criminality; drug, organ, and modern slave trade with dictatorships; dic­tatorships with civil wars and terror); and perhaps also, last but not least, because there is a politics of extreme violence that confuses all the forms to erect the figure of “evil” (humanitarian intervention sometimes partic­ipates in that), and because there is an economics of extreme violence, which makes both coverage and intervention sources of profitable busi­ness. I spoke of a division between zones of life and zones of death, with a fragile line of demarcation. It was tantamount to speaking of the “total­itarian” aspects of globalization. But globalization is clearly not only that. At the moment at which humankind becomes economically and, to some extent, culturally “united,” it is violently divided “biopolitically.” A poli­tics of civility (or a politics of human rights) can be either the imaginary substitute of the destroyed unity, or the set of initiatives that reintroduce everywhere, and particularly on the borderlines themselves, the issue of equality, the horizon of political action.

Toxic Tourism 1AC (12/19)

\_\_\_. No system can claim to be ethical that differentiates between valuable life and garbage life. Communicating pain and being present with the communities of drowned subjects is the only ethical approach to community and politics.

Ziarek, 2003. (Ewa). *Hypatia*. 18.2. Project MUSE. ZDS

The effects of Agamben’s “test” are corrosive: step by step, the book demonstrates why it is necessary “to clear away almost all the doctrines that, since Auschwitz, have been advanced in the name of ethics” (13). With remarkable precision, Agamben exposes the limits of existing ethical paradigms: not Friedrich Nietzsche’s overcoming of resentment, Jürgen Habermas’s and Karl-Otto Apel’s ethics of communication, Martin Heidegger’s being toward death, nor even Levinas’s ethics of responsibility are suffi cient to respond to the contradictory meaning of the Nazi crime: the unconditional triumph of death over life, and simultaneously, the utter degradation of death (81). The unprecedented degradation and dehumanization inflicted at Auschwitz confronts us with the collapse of all the familiar ethico-political categories: innocence and guilt, good and evil, dignity and disrespect, norm and exception, and finally, the human and the inhuman, life and death. The breakdown of the foundational distinctions takes us into what Primo Levi calls “a gray zone,” where all our “hagiographic” stereotypes and peremptory moral judgments founder. We cannot even call this collapse “tragic” because the crime of the concentration camps points to the “impossibility of the tragic paradigm” (1999, 99). And yet, Agamben warns us not to turn this collapse into a mystification of the “unsayable” or its opposite, the desire for complete understanding. “The only way forward,” he writes, “lies in investigating the space between these two options” (13). Precisely to avoid the mystifi cations of the “unsayable,” Agamben poses two central questions in the aftermath of his corrosive critique of the existing ethical categories: What is it in the degradation of Auschwitz that the existing ethical paradigms fail to account for, and what kind of an ethics is possible, indeed, urgently needed, after Auschwitz? In response to both of these questions, Agam- ben turns from philosophy to survivors’ testimonies, in particular Primo Levi’s The Drowned and the Saved (1989). The ethics that remains after Auschwitz is an ethics of testimony, and the fundamental task of such an ethics is to bear witness to the drowned, to the horror of the inhuman surviving the human. For Agamben, it is Primo Levi who analyzes a new image of evil of our times: the “new ethical reality” of the living corpses, whom in Levi’s words, “one hesitates to call . . . living: one hesitates to call their death death” (1986, 90). Reduced to an almost vegetative existence, the drowned have “touched the bottom” of utter destruction—they have been stripped not only of will, moral consciousness, and language but even of bodily stimuli (1989, 83). For Agamben, the drowned reveal a new meaning of Nazi extermination: a horrifi c “experiment” beyond life and death, an unthinkable attempt to reduce the human to a mere biological substance, to the remnant of bare life stripped of all meaningful distinction (63). It is this threshold of extreme destitution, which was nonetheless the norm in the camps, that makes it impossible to distinguish between human and non- human, life and death, ethics and physiology (Agamben 1999, 48). One of the most ambiguous and troubling names given to the drowned in what Levi calls “the jargon” of the camps is the Muselmann, a term which he cites as an instance of the extreme violence infl icted not only on human beings but also on language itself (1989, 97–98).

(CONTINUED)

Toxic Tourism 1AC (13/19)

(CONTINUED)

This term is at the center of Agamben’s study and yet resists etymological excavation even as his text is obsessed with exposing the forgotten and often compromising etymological layers of its central concepts. What does it mean to call the inhuman, the utter destruction of the human, the remainder of the bare biological life stripped of all signifi cation, by this “oriental” (Levi 1989, 70) name? What kind of double degradation of the Jewish and the Arab name does it entail? What is the contemporary sig-nifi cance of this double degradation for us? What kind of political and ethical response does it demand? As Agamben observes, this name is barely used in the historical studies on the destruction of the European Jews—“perhaps only now, almost fifty years later, is the Muselmann becoming visible” (52). The importance of Agamben’s study is to bring this name to light and to offer a painstaking commentary on the new horrific sense of destruction it reveals. But the book also shows that the ethical task of drawing the consequences of this visibility is far from over. Since it is impossible to do justice within the short space of this review essay to so many diffi cult political and ethical questions that the term Muselmann poses, I will stay with Primo Levi’s haunting phrase: “the drowned.” Representing an impossibility of vision and knowledge, the drowned address the human as an apostrophe from which it is impossible to turn away. It is in light of this apostrophe that Agamben offers his **critique of** all ethical systems, which, in order to safeguard ethical categories—including the notion of the human—fail to respond to this address and thus risk the exclusion of the living dead, the inhuman, from the human. Yet, if the ethical categories—such as dignity, guilt, and respect—break down in the confrontation with the living dead, then “they are not genuine ethical concepts, for no ethics can claim to exclude a part of humanity, no matter how unpleasant or difficult that humanity is to see” (1999, 64). This quotation reflects the fundamentally new ethical ori- entation of the book. The paramount importance of Agamben’s project—what he calls an ethics of testimony—is based neither on exclusion nor assimilation but on bearing witness to the impossible disjunction between the human and inhuman within the heart of subjectivity and enunciation. Agamben fi nds this new ethical orientation in the survivor’s testimonies, in particular in Primo Levi’s texts. What emerges from these works “is a new ethics, an ethics of a form of life that begins where dignity ends. And Levi, who bears witness to the drowned, speaking in their stead, is the cartographer of this new terra ethica” (1999, 69). Yet, what does it mean to bear witness to the drowned ones without either exclusion or assimilation? This question remains at the center of the growing literature on testimony, such as Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub’s Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (1992), Dominick LaCapra’s Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (1994), or Kelly Oliver’s Witnessing: Beyond Recognition (2001) (to name only a few). In this context, the originality of Agamben’s answer lies in the painstaking reflection on the ethical, philosophical, and political implications of what he presents as Primo Levi’s central ethical paradox: the survivor is not a true witness—the complete witness is the drowned one, the one who cannot speak. The antinomy of the complete witness thus yields two contradictory meanings: he is the nonhuman who could never bear witness; the one who cannot bear witness is the true witness (150).

(CONTINUED)

Toxic Tourism 1AC (14/19)

(CONTINUED)

Agamben’s reflection on this paradox leads not only to a redefinition of testimony but also to a new theory of enunciation and subjectivity. The aporia of a complete witness reveals a necessary “lacuna” at the heart of testimony—what in the testimony bears witness to the impossibility of wit- nessing. Agamben describes this dual structure of the testimony as “an impossible dialectic” between the survivor and the drowned, between speaking and witnessing, between the human and the inhuman, between the partial and the complete witness. In the testimony, the survivor who has not touched “the bottom” of destruction can only speak by proxy, in place of the true witness, who cannot speak. Thus, he becomes an agent of the “inhuman,” and his testimony has to be completed by the one who cannot bear witness. Yet, this paradoxical completion of the testimony coincides with the radical expropriation of the subject and language. In a crucial passage, Agamben writes: “to speak, to bear witness, is thus to enter into a vertiginous movement in which something sinks to the bottom, wholly desubjectified and silenced, and something subjectified speaks without truly having anything to say of its own. . . . Testimony takes place where the speechless one makes the speaking one speak and where the one who speaks bears the impossibility of speaking in his own speech” (120). Fractured between the saved and the drowned, between the human and the inhuman, the subject of the testimony is subject at once to two contradictory movements coextensive and yet non-coincident—to the potentiality and the loss of language, to subjectifiation and desubjectification. This fracture within the subject reveals the insufficiency of the two opposed discourses on Auschwitz—the anithumanist and the humanist, the one that insists on the unsayable and the other one that wants to express everything. For Agamben, the intimate yet irreducible disjunction in the testimony reveals the hidden structure of enunciation and subjectivity. In his brilliant negotiation between Michel Foucault’s notion of the archive and Arthur Benveniste’s theory of enunciation, Agamben demonstrates that the double movement of subjectification and desubjectification characterizes the act of speaking as such. He argues that the relation between language and the event demands the notion of the subject as a witness to the possible loss of speech within the very moment of its occurrence. Suspended between subjectification and desubjectification, such a subject of enunciation abolishes itself as an individual in order to becomes a subject of language. Agamben calls this double movement a kind of ontological shame, which does not imply a sense of imperfection but expropriation of the subject, its intimate exteriority to itself, its extreme passivity, its subjection to what one cannot assume. Agamben claims that this structure of enunciation is what enables testi- mony. Yet, if both testimony and enunciation in general are suspended between desubjectifi cation and subjectifi cation, between the loss and the potentiality of speech, then what happens to the specifi city of the survivors’ testimonies and to the uniqueness of Auschwitz? Agamben suggests, however, that it is in light of his theory of enunciation that we can begin to articulate the specifi city of the testimony and the monstrosity of the Nazi crime. Auschwitz represents a historical crime aiming to destroy the duality of enunciation, to separate the inhuman, the bare biological life, from the human. This crime consists in “a biopolitical experiment . . . that transforms and disarticulates the subject to a limit point in which the link between subjectifi cation and desubjectifi cation seems to break apart” (148). In this context, the ethical task of the testimony is to restore this link—not to overcome the utter desubjectification of the drowned one but to bear witness to it within the act of speaking. Testimony, in this sense, is an ethical act of survival that testifies to the impossibility of the total destruction of the human. Yet, it is a survival in a double sense: if the human survives the nonhuman, the drowned, whose bare life persists beyond the death of the human, survives the human. As the second of Levi’s paradoxes suggests: “the human being is the one who can survive the human being (151)”; **it is the relation between these two kinds of survival that constitutes the ethics of testimony.**

Toxic Tourism 1AC (15/19)

\_\_\_. We should accept the invitation to be present in the resolution and in the communities where energy is produced.

Toxic Tourism 1AC (16/19)

This weekend, for example, we’re arguing only a few miles away from communities struggling with toxic pollution. Last July, Jose Luis Villaseñor organized a toxic tour of the Phillips neighborhood of South Minneapolis. While the Twin Cities are recognized as one of the most friendly locales to bicycling in the United States, Jose knew that those opportunities for sustainable transportation were really only being offered to middle class, white folks. In Phillips, where the residents are cornered by refineries, foundries and other toxic polluters, where Latino children are 71% more likely to develop asthma, Jose organized the Tamales y Bicicletas tour. Knowing that the solution to pollution will come from those affected by it, Jose created a tour program that sought to communicate the pain and struggle of his community and to build networks of support. Although it is impossible for us to understand or totally experience the pain of individuals in these communities, tours like this offer an opportunity to communicate a portion of the community’s pain, a prerequisite for an energy politics that doesn’t exclude communities.

Pezzullo, 2007. (Phaedra, Prof of Communication at Indiana). *Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of*

*Pollution, Travel and Environmental Justice*. The University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, AL. Pg. 75-76. ZDS

Yet **the limits of our ability to understand the pain of other people—and, I would add, that of the Earth and all its inhabitants—does not mean that it is futile to strive for a closer understanding. If we give up on improving our ability to communicate with each other at all simply because communication is necessarily imperfect and incomplete, then we give up completely, because there is no resistance without communication.** Social change cannot occur without communication. Scarry suggests that the flaws inherent in communication are precisely what make it such a powerful facet of our lives: “**Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through its *unsharabilitiy*.” By not sharing, by not communicating, by not fumbling with language, our only option is to remain instruments for and objects of those who continue to create pain in the world. This is why tourism becomes important once again**, for as Dean MacCannel writes, “The term ‘touristic’ should have been restricted to refer to the circulation of the gift of shared notice.” At its most fundamental level, MacCannell argues**, tourism is an opportunity for a person or community to share, or to communicate, with another person or community about what is sacred, worthwhile, pleasurable, or meaningful. In a sense, tourism provides the possibility for us to unpack the baggage—the extraordinary and the banal, the good and the bad, the pleasure and the pain—that we as people, cultures, and inhabitants of the Erath carry with us**. To expand on what such a perspective of tourism might mean within the context of material and symbolic toxic pollution, I will now turn to specific practices of toxic tourism.

Toxic Tourism 1AC (17/19)

\_\_\_\_. Simply by positioning ourselves as present in the communities we tour is a rhetorical act that can disrupt the distinction between elite spaces and sacrifice zones.

Pezzullo, 2007. (Phaedra, Prof of Communication at Indiana). *Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of*

*Pollution, Travel and Environmental Justice*. The University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, AL. Pg. 9-10. ZDS

Being “present,” like roll call in school, indicates the significance of someone literally coexisting with another in a particular space and time. Yet, a rhetorical appreciation of “presence” also can indicate when we feel as if someone, someplace, or something matters, whether or not she/he/it is physically present with us. Presence also refers, then, to the structure of feeling or one’s affective experience when certain elements – and, perhaps, more importantly, relationships and communities – in space and time appear more immediate to us, such that we can imagine their “realness” or “feasibility” in palpable and significant ways. Through the rhetorical performance of a toxic tour, for example, people, places, processes and things may seem more tangible to us and, thus, we may be more persuaded to identify with or believe in their existence, their significance, and their consequence. Communicating a sense of presence, in other words, offers a means for marginalized communities to challenge feelings of alienation from the land and each other. It is sensual.

**Toxic Tourism 1AC (18/19)**

**\_\_\_. Our act of tourism has to be distinct from making false claims to membership in a community or from hijacking their agenda. Being present is a performance of opening ourselves to a necessary and genuine communication with oppressed communities.**

Pezzullo, 2007. (Phaedra, Prof of Communication at Indiana). *Toxic Tourism: Rhetorics of*

*Pollution, Travel and Environmental Justice*. The University of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa, AL. Pg. 19-20. ZDS

I, on the other hand, am not poor, nor am I a person of color. I don’t live in a grassroots community of the movement. I am middle class and live with white privilege. I choose to visit places that have been polluted and to struggle for environmental justice. There is a difference. Still, my sense of identification and my identity as an “outsider” are not necessarily contradictory. Perhaps it can be said of all social movements that there have been those who have supported movements without sharing a common history with those who inspired the movement. To name a few who have been particularly notable “outsiders”: Frederick Douglass was part of the women’s liberation movement; Michael Schwerner and Andrew Goodman were part of the civil rights movement; and Fred Ross was part of the farmworkers’ movement. Yet for those of us who literally go out of our way to participate in a movement, our “belonging” does mean something different. There is something distinct at stake in the performances of those of us who are able to choose our association more freely. We do not have the “privilege” of belonging as readily (if ever) as those closer to the location and identities of struggle. Conversely, those of us who are literally farther from the location or identities of struggle are more open to accusations of falsely claiming membership, because we tend to have more choice as to whether or not to leave the movement. Since my interest and research are dialectically related, it is sometimes difficult and usually undesirable to say when one or the other of these impulses drives my actions and perceptions; yet I believe it is less helpful to try to create some artificial line between the two than it is to ask whether the results of my efforts are viable as one or the other or both. Rather than romanticizing “critical distance” as a criterion of academic research, I prefer to adhere to an epistemological stance that aims to achieve what Dwight Conquergood calls “genuine conversation” in a “dialogical performance,” a position located somewhere within and between the tensions of detachment and commitment, objectivity and subjectivity. Likewise, as D. Soyini Madison points out, performance in its many forms is “a communicative act in which you basically have people saying: I want to connect my body and my voice to this story that is not mine, or yet that could be.” As I have indicated already, despite the embodied economic, racial, gendered, and political differences between people, part of the goal of this book is to trouble false assumptions that we are not implicated in each other’s stories.

Toxic Tourism 1AC (19/19)

\_\_\_. A community-driven approach is necessary to our advocacy for the resolution. Including in our affirmations the spaces where energy is produced aligns debaters with the communities that are necessarily a part of the resolution.

Lee, 1996. (Charles, Chair of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council). “Public

Dialogues on Urban Revitalization and Brownfields: Envisioning Healthy and Sustainable Communities.” <http://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/

publications/nejac/public-dialogue-brownfields-1296.pdf>. ZDS

Although this report provides an extensive set of recommendations, it attempts as its "heart and soul" to illustrate the organic interrelationships between people, community, social institutions, government, and public policy. The "glue" which sustains these relationships is a system of values which treats the hopes and aspirations of people and families as important, exhibits compassion and care for the less fortunate, and supports the social fabric which enables communities to be healthy, wholesome, and sustainable. When environmental justice posited the notion that "people must speak for themselves" about an environment defined as the place where "we live, where we work, and where we play," it established a framework for functionally bridging the key components of emerging environmental policy, i.e., ecosystem management and community-based environmental protection, equal protection, pollution prevention, cumulative risk and sound science, programmatic integration and government reinvention, and accountability to the public. This fact needs to be elevated as a major tenet of emerging environmental policy.

Moreover, the Brownfields issue compels an examination of integration between place-based approaches to environmental protection with sector-based approaches and their implications for industrial policy. More likely than not, any industrial sector which has entered its second generation and beyond will have large numbers of large numbers of Brownfield sites. Environmental and economic policy must take into account the benefits and costs of the entire "life-cycle" of an industrial sector or facility. Failure to do so results in passing on costs to future generations. For this reason, pollution prevention must be integrated as an overarching principle into all Brownfields projects. Environmental justice is predicated upon the fact that the health of the members of a community, both individually and collectively, is a product of physical, social, cultural, and spiritual factors. It provides a key to understanding an integrative environmental policy which treats our common ecosystem as the basis for all life (human and non-human) and activity (economic and otherwise).